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1. General Introduction  
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in southern Africa in which African majority rule was 
achieved only in 1980. Dual structures in the social, economic and political spheres are 
legacies of the racist settler regime. In this context the national government has had the 
difficult task of attempting to redress past inequities without alienating the white 
population.  
1.1 Human Development  
Zimbabwe has achieved impressive strides in human development since independence, as 
reflected by improvements in such indicators as literacy, child mortality and life 
expectancy which stand well above regional averages (see table 1). Access to services 
important for human development also compares favourably with countries of the region. 
For example, combined primary and secondary enrolment ratios stood at 95% by 1986-
88. These achievements reflect a substantial restructuring of public expenditures since 
independence towards priority social services and away from defence.  
Nonetheless, the country remains amongst the "low human development" group as 
classified by the 1992 Human Development Report. Improved performance is especially 
urgent in certain areas, including economic growth, daily calorie supply as percentage of 
requirements and maternal mortality rates. Serious disparities in human development 
indicators and access to services persist, reflecting the continuing impact of past 
discrimination.  Rural-urban gaps reveal the disadvantages faced by the majority black population, who 
are largely rural based. Whereas all urban dwellers are estimated to have access to health 
services, only about six in ten living in the countryside do. One study found that, in 1979, 
the income of urban non-black residents stood at Z$8500, compared to the average Z$220 
earned by rural peasant farmers, a disparity of 39:1. Within the urban areas inequality 
was estimated at 27:1 (Riddell 1982). In 1980, whites had exclusive ownership of almost 
half the land (two-thirds of the best land; see table 2) and (together with foreign interests) 
owned virtually all of the capital in industry and mining.  
1.2 The Economy  
Structure  
With an abundance of natural resources, relatively good physical infrastructure and a 
diversified industrial sector, the Zimbabwean economy has been described as the "most 
highly developed in black Sub-Saharan Africa" (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). In 1988 
services accounted for 38% of GDP, followed by the industrial sector, including mining 
(7% of GDP and 40% of export revenue) and a diversified manufacturing base (26% of 
GDP and 16% of formal sector employment). The period of UDI (Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence) left a closed economy, with enforced protection stimulated by state 
intervention favouring settler interests. Agriculture represents 15% of national income, 
employing approximately 70% of the total labour force and 25% of formal sector 
employees. The inherited dual structure of agriculture has been modified to some extent 
since independence, but the distinction between the commercial (largely white, large 
scale farming) and Communal Lands, farmed by blacks, remains important.  
Recent Trends  
Between 1974-79 national income fell, with an increasing share of public expenditure (up 
to 30-40%) directed towards the military. Since independence, economic performance 
has fluctuated, largely due to extraneous factors, including drought, world recession, 
falling demand for Zimbabwe's exports and foreign exchange shortages. Overall, real 
economic growth averaged 3% in the 1980s - growth in per capita terms was almost 
negligible.  
The African government maintained a policy of economic nationalism in the context of 
strong state control. But there was external pressure to shift this focus. In 1982 an IMF 
agreement was signed, which broke down in 1984. In 1990 an Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program (ESAP) was launched, with the support of the IMF and World 
Bank, featuring trade liberalisation, market-based interest rates, reductions in the budget 
deficit and domestic deregulation.  
In the rural areas, extensive commercial farming areas remain dominated by a relatively 
small number of white farmers, who still receive 70% of agricultural credit, extension 
and other services (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). Yet since independence the Communal Lands have increased their share of national supplies of crops and livestock, as many of 
the disadvantages facing them were reversed.  
1.3 Politics  
Political developments in independent Zimbabwe were constrained by the Lancaster 
House agreement. The Constitution (for a time) 1 entrenched the interests of the whites, 
reserving a certain number of parliamentary seats for whites-only, and prohibiting 
compulsory acquisition of most land. These legal constraints, combined with the practical 
desire to secure an 'orderly transition' which would avoid the sudden exodus of capital 
and white settlers experienced by Mozambique, led to what was termed a policy of 
'reconciliation'.  
By the time of independence, the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) had a 
well established organisation throughout much of the country. The party secured 63% of 
the black vote, and 57 of the 80 black seats in the first national elections in 1980 when 
Robert Mugabe formed a government. Nkomo's Zimbabwean African People's Union 
(ZAPU) won twenty seats, mainly in Matabeleland. The first Cabinet included both 
ZAPU and segregationist politicians, but ZAPU was excluded from the government in 
1983. After several years of tension and violence, ZANU and ZAPU signed a unity 
accord in 1987. At the national elections in March 1990, ZANU-PF won all but three of 
the 120 seats contested, and Mugabe received 78% of total votes cast for the presidency. 
However there was a significant abstention rate; only 54% of eligible voters went to the 
polls, compared to turnout rates of over 90% in the 1980 and 1985 elections.  
Although the black population has experienced substantial advances in access to health 
and education services and economic opportunities since independence, they still face 
serious problems of poverty and unemployment. It is reported that the gap between the 
'benz' lifestyle enjoyed by the 'chefs' (party and government leaders) and that of most 
Zimbabweans, is bitterly resented. While ESAP was portrayed as a means of "working 
together for all of us"2, it is uncertain whether the reform measures will promote the 
intended goals without adversely affecting vulnerable groups in Zimbabwean society.  
2. Structure of Government and Decentralization Measures  
At the national level there have been significant changes in the structure of government 
since independence, the net result being a single chamber of parliament and an executive 
presidency directly elected by the people, with a move towards a one-party state, 
particularly since 1988. From Independence, the government declared its intention to 
promote decentralization, and supported this by a series of institutional innovations.  
2.1 Steps toward decentralization  
a. The colonial system and the position at independence.  In the colonial era, the policy of racial segregation dominated economic and social 
policies enforced by such legislation as the Land Apportionment Act 1930 (Mutizwa-
Mangiza 1985). Local government was divided on the basis of race - Urban Councils and 
Rural Councils (formed in the 1960s out of the 'road committees') were elected by the 
whites for white settler areas and enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy. In contrast, Native 
Councils (later termed African Councils), which covered the communal African farming 
areas, were subject to central control. A key official was the Native (later District) 
Commissioner, appointed by the central government, who was ex-officio President of the 
Council. Community development boards were created in the 1960s -under the authority 
of the District commissioner - to define the development needs of the community. The 
number of African Councils grew over time to 242 by 1980.  
During the period of UDI the administration of black rural areas became increasingly 
centralised and authoritarian, dominated by centrally-appointed commissioners with 
"dictatorial powers" (Mutizwa-Mangizwa 1985,p.60). Extensive centrally-determined 
rules governed such activities as land use. The motive was that of central control rather 
than local development (Stonemen and Cliffe 1989). According to Mutizwa-Mangiza, 
shortage of arable land in Tribal Trust Lands was a fundamental problem (see table 2) 
which resulted in impoverished African Councils for blacks, with affluent Rural and 
Urban Councils for whites. The African Councils were very fragmented geographically. 
Key administrative personnel occupied an ambiguous position - chiefs were the paid and 
appointed officials of the government, and were also supposed to represent African 
opinion. From the early 1970s, in an increasing number of areas the rebels gradually 
managed to gain control and settler authority broke down.  
At independence there was a declared commitment to decentralization and participation, 
and therefore a clear need to restructure government at the local level. In practice this has 
taken three forms. First the creation of new Ministries and deconcentration of others: the 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), and the 
Ministry of Community Development and Co-operatives (MC&CD) were established, 
while most Ministries have been dispersed spatially, and are formally represented down 
to the district level. The extension workers of the MC&CD operate at the village level. In 
other words there has been a significant deconcentration of central government activities. 
Secondly, a series of legislative enactments and directives have sought to democratise 
and strengthen local government, although the system of local government is 
characterised by uneven development across the country, in terms of functions, capacity 
and resource base. Thirdly, a participatory organisational structure was established to 
permit local participation in development planning.  
b. District Councils Act 1980.  
The District Councils Act 1980 (amended in 1981 and 1982) applied to the Communal 
Lands, where it revived local government after the period of guerrilla insurgency, 
consolidated the previously fragmented authorities from over 220 to 55, and 
democratised the system of local government. District Councils consist predominantly of 
elected members, plus those nominated under the Act (e.g. chiefs and headmen are ex officio members). They are chaired by an elected member. The councils are the principal 
planning and development agencies within their jurisdictional zones. They have limited 
powers of taxation, implement a variety of central legislative enactments, and provide 
various services. The District Administrator, who is chief executive of the council, is a 
national civil servant, responsible for overall planning, development and co-ordination. 
Although the traditional leaders who had dominated local government during the colonial 
era were not removed (as in Tanzania, for example), no new ones were appointed and 
their powers of adjudication and land allocation were transferred to the District Councils. 
The average population per DC is 78 000, although it varies from 15,000 (Mzarabani) to 
227,000 (Gokwe -data for 1982).  
c. The Prime Minister's Directive 1984  
Organisational structures for popular participation in development planning were outlined 
in the Prime Minister's Directive on Decentralization (1984 & 1985), which provided the 
basis for a hierarchy of representative bodies at the village, ward, district and provincial 
levels.  
Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) are elected bodies with responsibility for 
defining local needs. VIDCOs present village needs to Ward Development Committees 
(WADCOs), which cover about six villages and consist of VIDCO representatives. They 
oversee and prioritise local needs and forward these to the District Council. Each ward is 
represented by a district councillor.  
District Development Committees (DDC) are planning and co-ordination committees, 
composed of two local councillors, together with 18-28 central government officials from 
the sectoral ministries, and the police, army, and Central Intelligence Organisation. 
Membership is dominated by representatives of the central government. They are chaired 
by the District Administrator, currently a CG employee. The main planning functions of 
the DDC are to formulate District Development plans (short and long term), based in part 
on the plans forwarded from the VIDCOs and WADCOs. These are forwarded to the 
Provincial Development Committee (see below). The DDC also submit annual estimates 
to the Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP) via the Provincial Development 
Committees. The DDCs permit horizontal co-ordination of the activities of sectoral 
ministries and local authorities.  
d. Provincial Councils and Administration Act 1985  
This legislation gave increased focus to the province, for planning. Table 3 presents the 
populations and area of each of the eight provinces. The Provincial Council consists of 
the chairmen and one councillor selected by each of the Councils in the province 
(District, Rural and Urban), one member nominated by the ruling party, and a 
representative from the Provincial Assembly of Chiefs. It is chaired by the Provincial 
Governor, who is appointed by the President and enjoys Cabinet rank, and sits in the 
national parliament. Governors are responsible for co-ordination of the activities of 
sectoral ministries and the District Councils. It is their task to liaise with the Development Committees and oversee District Councils; however the office of Governor 
lacks mandatory powers in respect of both local authorities and sectoral ministries. The 
Provincial Development Committee (PDC) is composed of heads of ministries at 
provincial level, members nominated by the police, army and Central Intelligence 
Organisation, the Provincial Planning Officer of the Department of Physical Planning, 
and leaders of commerce and industry operating within the province who may be co-
opted. The committee is chaired by the Provincial Administrator, a central government 
employee, and is responsible for formulating plans for co-ordinated development in the 
province. To this end it produces short and long term plans which are supposed to reflect 
a combination of District Development Plans, provincial plans of Ministries, the PDC's 
own ideas, government national policies and, where possible, major development plans of 
private organisations (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). It is important to note that the province 
itself does not have any functional responsibilities, nor does it have any source of finance. 
At present, the primary role of the province in the development planning process is to 
ensure that district project proposals are co-ordinated, and presented to sectoral ministries 
-i.e. a project sorting function (PDSP 1991).  
e. Amalgamation 1988+  
The most recent legislative reform, the Rural District Councils Act 1988, purported to 
end the dual system of local government in rural Zimbabwe, through amalgamation of the 
Rural Councils and the District Councils into 55 Rural District Councils. 3 The aim is to 
overcome the colonial legacy of separate development based on race, and to permit a 
more equitable distribution of public services. However the amalgamation has been 
fraught with difficulties and reflects a range of compromises which seriously detract from 
its ostensible objectives. Full democratic participation has not been extended to the 
former Rural Council areas, where only local taxpayers and their spouses are able to vote, 
thereby excluding the black landless farmworkers (i.e. the majority of the population in 
these areas). Nor does the RDC Act unify the tax base, but continues to rely on the basic 
tenurial divisions between the different wards: commercial, communal and resettlement, 
and urban. The proceeds of the land development levy (collected from the commercial 
wards) are to be spent on road maintenance. Thus as Helmsing (1991) points out, whilst 
the Act formally does away with a relic of separate development, "basic socio-economic 
and tenurial divisions have remained and the Act accepts these and the RDC is organised 
around these divisions" (p.134). In any case in early 1992 it had still not come into effect. 
Attempts at implementation began in 1990, through the resolution of boundary disputes.  
2.2 Overview of current responsibilities and system of finance  
The responsibilities and powers of District Councils fall into two broad spheres - the 
delivery of basic social and economic services at the local level, and participation in 
development planning. In theory, the District Council also has significant responsibilities 
in planning development activities within the area, although local efforts in this sphere 
are often perceived to be rather ineffective (see below).  The scope of the powers and responsibilities of the DCs is much more limited than the 
Rural and Urban Councils (see table 4). The District Councils are responsible (often 
concurrently with sectoral ministries) for a range of services, including basic education 
and health, sanitation, housing and social welfare, as well as some business ventures 
intended to generate income to help finance their expenditures (e.g. retailing liquor). 
However, most DC expenditure goes to education (around 90% - Table 5).  
The allocation of functions between different levels of government is not well defined, so 
that it is not always apparent where central government activities should stop and where 
local authority activities should start (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1990). In some areas this has 
been a source of controversy. Regarding primary education, for example, the Ministry 
has sought to recentralise vital elements of the service. Teachers, who were formerly 
selected, recruited and paid through the District Council were, in 1987, placed under a 
National Unified Teaching Service administered by the Ministry of Education. The 
Ministry of Health proposed a similar recentralisation of health personnel, although this 
has not yet been carried through.  
In Zimbabwe the most striking feature of current financial arrangements is the 
overwhelming dependence of District Councils upon central grants which are tied to 
specific purposes. On average, District Councils raise only 15% of total local revenue 
through taxes, rates, charges, etc; the remainder comes in the form of transfers from the 
centre all of which are tied to particular activities, approved centrally. What constitutes 
an "approved expenditure" is determined by central ministerial regulations and circulars. 
The grants system works with advances and reimbursements based upon approvals. There 
are effectively no block grants to the district level other than a lump sum for 
administration, which is based on central calculations of local requirements. In education, 
for example, there is a tuition grant, to be used for the purpose of "tuition" only (narrowly 
defined), and not for any other expenses. The lack of discretion in local expenditures is 
exemplified by the extremely fragmented system of accounts kept by District Councils, 
which involve up to fifteen separate accounts for different revenues and activities. with 
no flexibility of movement of funds within or between accounts. Thus the colonial 
practice wherein the vast majority of financial allocations were made on a sectoral basis 
has been maintained, which effectively means a very centralised and compartmentalised 
system of finance.  
The DCs have very limited powers of taxation: they collect a small amount of revenue 
from the development levy (a poll tax), a little more from fees, licenses, and income 
generating projects, but mainly rely on central government grants. In contrast, the urban 
and rural councils receive a significant proportion of revenue from rates on property and 
a levy on beer.  
To summarise, since independence there have been important changes in the structure of 
government, broadly favouring decentralization. First, there has been significant 
deconcentration of sectoral ministries to the local level. Second, democratic structures 
have been established at the district level, which will be further improved when (as 
envisaged) the DA becomes responsible to the DC, and not a centrally appointed official, and amalgamation is completed. Third, participatory structures were established to allow 
local participation in national planning from the village level upwards.  
But the real extent of decentralization has been limited by a number of factors: first, as 
noted above, by lack of financial autonomy of the DCs; second, by moves by important 
sectoral ministries to recentralise activities; third, limited influence of the local authorities 
over the National Plan in practice (to be discussed below); fourth, by excessive focus on 
the Provincial level, which has no directly elected representatives, and no powers of 
taxation; and finally, political factors, including the absence of a secret ballot, and the 
dominance of a centralised single party structure.  
   
   
1 In fact the whites-only electoral roll was abolished in 1987, and property rights could be altered from 
1990.  
2 This is the theme of the strident public media campaign in 1991 launched in three languages, in 
newspapers, radio and television across the country.  
3 The local government units are still small, relative to the rest of Africa.   
 